Synonyms and Antonyms of identity. The state of being exactly alike. Although the covers of the two paperback editions of the novel are different, there's a complete identity in the texts.

Identity theory, in, one view of modern Materialism that asserts that mind and matter, however capable of being logically distinguished, are in actuality but different expressions of a single reality that is material. Strong emphasis is placed upon the verification of such statements as: “Thought is reducible to motion in the brain.”The is similar to this, with one notable exception: reality is not material; it is either mental or neutral.

The latter case is illustrated by an undulating line that is both concave and convex at the same time; each aspect is an, but only a partial, expression of the total reality.

For other uses, see.In, identity, from: ('sameness'), is the relation each thing bears only to itself. The notion of identity gives rise to, including the (if x and y share all their properties, are they one and the same thing?), and questions about change and over time (what has to be the case for a person x at one time and a person y at a later time to be one and the same person?).The philosophical concept of identity is distinct from the more well-known notion of identity in use in and the.

The philosophical concept concerns a, specifically, a relation that x and y stand in they are one and the same thing, or identical to each other (i.e. If, and only if x = y). The, by contrast, has to do with a person's self-conception, social presentation, and more generally, the aspects of a person that make them unique, or qualitatively different from others (e.g., and processes of ). This section needs additional citations for. Unsourced material may be challenged and removed.Find sources: – ( July 2012) Metaphysicians and philosophers of language and mind ask other questions:. What does it mean for an object to be the same as itself?.

If x and y are identical (are the same thing), must they always be identical? Are they necessarily identical?. What does it mean for an object to be the same, if it changes over time? (Is apple t the same as apple t+1?). If an object's parts are entirely replaced over time, as in the example, in what way is it the same?The originates from. The modern formulation of identity is that of, who held that x is the same as y every true of x is true of y as well.Leibniz's ideas have taken root in the, where they have influenced the development of the as.

Mathematicians sometimes distinguish identity from. More mundanely, an identity in may be an that holds true for all values of a. Argued that things are inherently self-contradictory and that the notion of something being self-identical only made sense if it were not also not-identical or different from itself and did not also imply the latter. In 's words, 'Identity is the identity of identity and non-identity.' More recent metaphysicians have discussed —the notion that there can be the same object in different possible worlds. An alternative to trans-world identity is the counterpart relation in.

It is a similarity relation that rejects trans-world individuals and instead defends an objects counterpart - the most similar object.Some philosophers have denied that there is such a relation as identity. Thus writes ( 5.5301): 'That identity is not a relation between objects is obvious.' At 5.5303 he elaborates: 'Roughly speaking: to say of two things that they are identical is nonsense, and to say of one thing that it is identical with itself is to say nothing.' Had earlier voiced a worry that seems to be motivating Wittgenstein's point ( §64): 'Identity, an objector may urge, cannot be anything at all: two terms plainly are not identical, and one term cannot be, for what is it identical with?' Even before Russell, at the beginning of ',' expressed a worry with regard to identity as a relation: 'Equality gives rise to challenging questions which are not altogether easy to answer. Is it a relation?' More recently, has suggested that identity should be viewed as a second-order relation, rather than a relation between objects, and has argued that appealing to a binary relation that every object bears to itself, and to no others, is both logically unnecessary and metaphysically suspect.Identity statements Kind-terms, or give a criterion of identity and non-identity among items of their kind.See also.

/.Notes. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy:, First published Wed Dec 15, 2004; substantive revision Sun Oct 1, 2006. The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, 2nd Edition, CUP: 1995. C.J.F. Williams, What is identity?, Oxford University Press 1989. Kai F. Wehmeier, 'How to live without identity—and why,' Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90:4, 2012, pp.

761–777.References. Gallois, A. 1998: Occasions of identity. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Parfit, D. 1984: Reasons and persons. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Life of black tiger cheats. From study dates to actual dates, play Life: The Game and see if your life is delightful or disastrous. Life: The Game on Poki is the best way to experience an entire journey, from birth to death, in game form!

Robinson, D. 1985: Can amoebae divide without multiplying? Australasian journal of philosophy, 63(3): 299–319.:.

Sidelle, A. 2000: Review of Gallois (1998). Philosophical review, 109(3): 469-471. Sider, T. 2001: Review of Gallois (1998). British journal for the philosophy science, 52(2): 401-405.:External links. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy:, First published Wed Dec 15, 2004; substantive revision Sun Oct 1, 2006.

Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy:. First published Fri 18 March 2005. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy:. First published Tue Aug 20, 2002; substantive revision Tue Feb 20, 2007. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy:. First published Mon 22 April 2002., Mariela Michel,.